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NOTE
“THE GOOD OF EACH OF THE
PARTS”: A COLLECTIVE ACTION
UNDERSTANDING OF THE TREATY
CLAUSE
EDWARD C. BEACH, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution gives the President the
power, “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”1 The
Supremacy Clause gives treaties—like federal statutes—the status of
supreme law in the constitutional system.2 But the process for
concluding treaties differs markedly from the process for passing an act
of Congress. First, the Constitution’s normal lawmaking powers reside
in Article I,3 but the Treaty Clause rests in Article II with the
President’s powers.4 Second, states can typically make their own law
alongside federal legislation, but the Constitution expressly forbids
states from entering into any “Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”5
Third, the Constitution requires that acts of Congress earn the approval
of only a majority of the House and the Senate and signature from the
President to become law; whereas treatymaking requires leadership
from the President and approval by a supermajority of present senators
but no formal input or approval from the House of Representatives.6
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1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2. Id. art. VI, § 2.
3. Id. art. I, § 1.
4. Id. art. II, § 2.
5. Id. art. I, § 10.
6. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Many endeavors to rationalize the treaty power’s peculiarities start
with the distinction between domestic and foreign lawmaking. What
might explain the differences between the treaty and legislative powers
is that foreign affairs raise unique concerns and therefore require
unusual procedures. After all, American foreign relations were
precarious when the Constitution was ratified—America’s survival was
not assured, and the new government needed safeguards to ensure that
it arranged its foreign affairs carefully.7 But one does not need to
separate foreign lawmaking from domestic lawmaking to make sense
of the treaty power. Rather, this Note argues that an understanding of
collective action—defined broadly as “action taken by or on behalf of
groups of individuals”8—can explain the treaty power just as collective
action reasoning can illuminate Congress’s Article I powers.9 But
where much of the Constitution enables collective action by
empowering a simple legislative majority to act,10 the Treaty Clause
imposes a higher procedural bar to restrain collective action and
prevent states in the majority from exploiting states in the minority.
Preratification history is essential to understanding the treaty
power through a collective action framework. Founding-era regional
tension was the primary factor that shaped the Treaty Clause. States
worried that their fellow sovereigns would abuse the treaty power to
enjoy the benefits of a treaty themselves while imposing the costs
7. See GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, WE HAVE NOT A GOVERNMENT: THE ARTICLES
CONFEDERATION AND THE ROAD TO THE CONSTITUTION 17 (2017) (“The 1783 Treaty of
Peace greatly expanded the United States’ boundaries . . . . But the peace terms had strong
enemies in Britain, other major European powers, and Native Americans.”).
8. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 5 (1965).
9. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (2010) (explaining that under the Articles of
Confederation, states could not protect themselves from foreign military war or interstate
commercial war because they “acted individually when they needed to act collectively”).
10. See Part I, infra. Several provisions of the Constitution addressed a primary weakness of
the Articles of Confederation—the inability of the Confederation Congress to solve collective
action problems among the states. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 9, at 117 (“Article I, Section 8
of the new Constitution gave Congress additional powers to address collective action problems.”).
For example, the Confederation faced extreme debt from fighting the Revolutionary War, but
the Articles did not empower the Confederation Congress to raise revenues to pay down that
debt. See VAN CLEVE, supra note 7, at 48 (“By far the most momentous problem facing both
American leaders and many ordinary citizens after the war was a giant overhang of debt.”). The
new Constitution avoided such a collective action problem by fixing the power to raise revenues
firmly within Congress’s enumerated powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Because the states could
not coordinate to collectively fund the demands of their shared government, Congress would be
empowered to raise funds directly. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 9, at 119 (“The theory of
collective action federalism interprets the clauses of Section 8 as authorizing Congress to tax,
spend, and regulate when two or more states face collective action problems.”).
OF
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elsewhere. The Treaty Clause embodies that tension: It empowers some
collective action among the states, but action is still restrained by the
Treaty Clause’s procedural requirements, which ensure that a majority
of states cannot form a treaty that exploits a minority.
Because the interstate tension that shaped the Treaty Clause has
long-since dissipated, the Clause restrains collective action and makes
forming treaties too difficult today. The modern preference for nonArticle II agreements (e.g., congressional-executive agreements)
supports that notion. Accordingly, non-Article II processes may be
most appropriate for agreements that distribute benefits and costs
evenly among states. Although identifying such treaties is likely a
value-driven exercise, some examples might be those that set national
policies applicable to all states, such as regulations pertaining to capital
punishment or national greenhouse gas emissions standards. Although
collective action reasoning is useful for understanding the origins of the
treaty clause, it does not fully delineate which agreements should, as a
normative matter, pass through the Article II process. Moreover, it does
not explain, as a descriptive matter, the split in modern practice
between those agreements that pass through the Article II process and
those that do not.
Part I of this Note will briefly explain collective action reasoning.
Part II will examine treatymaking under the Articles of Confederation
and other preratification history that informs our understanding of the
Treaty Clause. Part III will explore the extent to which collective action
reasoning influenced the Framers as they debated the treaty power
during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. It will sample
debates over the Treaty Clause at the Constitutional Convention and
the Virginia and North Carolina ratification conventions. Part IV will
first examine the original assumptions behind the treaty power and
whether they should continue to inform our procedures for modern
international agreements. Next, it will consider non-Article II
international agreements and evaluate what their prevalence means for
the collective action understanding of the treaty process. Lastly, Part V
will consider the criticisms and limits of understanding the treaty power
through a collective action framework.
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I. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND TREATYMAKING
Treatymaking can be understood as a collective action problem.11
A collective action problem occurs when members of a group face a
common problem, but something (e.g., competing incentives,
inadequate communication, information asymmetries, etc.) prevents
them from cooperating to solve it.12 Often, the factor that prevents
cooperation is the incentive to act self-interestedly, rather than to
maximize the whole group’s well-being.13
Members in a group can more easily act together when doing so
does not require unanimous approval, but any threshold below
unanimity may subject the minority to the majority’s will. The
difference between interstate compacts and congressional legislation
illustrates this relationship between collective action and minority
exploitation. Interstate compacts require unanimity from participating
states.14 But Congress can pass a federal law through a majoritarian
process and impose solutions that the states would not reach
otherwise.15 Legislating based on majority rule reduces the threat of
holdouts—that one state will hold up the entire project to draw out
more concessions—but it raises the risk that the legislative majority will
exploit the minority.16 Acting on majority rule through Congress thus
produces a tradeoff between facilitating collective action and
protecting the minority.17
11. “Collective action” is a broad term that encompasses many different types of behavior
within a group. See generally Clint Peinhardt & Todd Sandler, Principles of Collective Action and
Game Theory, in TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION: AN ISSUE-BASED APPROACH (2015) (using
introductory game theory to explain general principles of collective action and common
archetypes of collective action problems). This Note uses the term in the context of the Treaty
Clause to refer to a situation where states have narrowly self-interested reasons to support or
oppose entering the United States into an international agreement.
12. Vincent McGuire, The Collective Action Problem, https://spot.colorado.edu/~mcguire/
collact.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
13. See OLSON, supra note 8, at 2 (“If the members of a large group rationally seek to
maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group objectives
unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive . . . is offered to
the members of the group . . . .”); see also Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust,
Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 71–72 (2003) (amending Olson’s logic to
suggest that individuals in a group are motivated not by purely rational calculations, but by a
“more emotionally nuanced reciprocal” posture under which the decision to cooperate or not is
also motivated by what other individuals decide).
14. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 9, at 140.
15. See id. at 144 (“The central government operating through majority rule can find
solutions that elude states cooperating through unanimity rule.”).
16. See id. at 142 (“Switching from unanimity rule to majority rule ameliorates the problem
of holdouts, but it creates a new problem: minority exploitation.”).
17. See id. at 144 (“Empowering Congress animates collective action, but risks exploiting
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The state compact example provides general lessons that can apply
in other collective action contexts. When parties lack a centralized
system through which they can collectively act, they must resort to ad
hoc agreements to solve collective problems. Parties pursue agreements
that promote their own interests, and each agreement binds only the
parties that consent to it. When each party is free to participate (or
defect) at-will, collective action requires unanimity. But groups can
avoid this unanimity requirement by acting through a central
government, which facilitates collective action through a less-thanunanimity rule.18
Using these concepts, treatymaking can be understood through a
collective action framework. Foreign relations is an area where states
must act as a collective and speak with one voice.19 It makes intuitive
sense that individual states cannot effectively conduct foreign relations
for the whole country, and this intuition is reflected in doctrines like
preemption and the assignment of some powers exclusively to the
executive in the foreign affairs context.20
If a federal process for making treaties did not exist, states that
wanted to enter treaties could only offer foreign nations the resources
or cooperation of other consenting states in the treaty. This effective
unanimity requirement would mean that the nation would ultimately
make few treaties because few would win unanimous approval from the
states.
Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from
entering treaties themselves, meaning that if the states want to make

states in the minority.”).
18. See Peinhardt & Sandler, supra note 11, at 21 (explaining that institutional design can
help solve collective action problems through cost sharing and other schemes that shape actors’
incentives).
19. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964) (noting that
various constitutional provisions and statutes reflected “a concern for uniformity in this country’s
dealings with foreign nations” and indicated “a desire to give matters of international significance
to the jurisdiction of federal institutions”).
20. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 30 (2015) (holding that
Congress could not regulate the President’s exercise of the recognition power because doing so
would “prevent the Nation from speaking with one voice” and “prevent the Executive itself from
doing so in conducting foreign relations”); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409 (2012)
(holding that federal immigration law preempted several provisions of state immigration law in
part because decisions that bear on the removability of foreign nationals “touch on foreign
relations and must be made with one voice”); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 381 (2000) (finding that a state law restricting state business with Burma was preempted by
federal law in part because it “compromise[d] the very capacity of the President to speak for the
Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments”).
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treaties, they must do so by working together through the federal
government.21 But under the federal treatymaking power, treaties can
come into being with less than unanimous approval from the states.22
Instead, two-thirds of states can—through their senators—commit the
whole nation to a treaty.23 By requiring less than unanimity from the
states, the treaty power thus enables collective action. But the
supermajority requirement for treaties also restrains collective
action—particularly in comparison to Congress’s majority-rule
functions. This restraint represents a decision to err on the side of
preventing minority exploitation by making collective action harder.
It is significant that a minority of states can block a treaty because
treaties can reach substantive areas in which small groups of states
might self-interestedly oppose collective action.24 For example, a treaty
that settles a boundary dispute to avoid international conflict might
protect the whole country from the peril and cost of war, but the state
or region asked to cede territory might be inclined to hold out for a
different resolution. Alternatively, an international trade deal that
secures lower-cost foreign goods may benefit consumers nation-wide,
but states with companies that produce substitute goods might oppose
the deal.
There are multiple ways to view the treaty power in a collective
action framework. For example, when treaties create obligations on
behalf of the states, the federal government faces a potential collective
action problem in getting states to comply.25 By the same token, nations
can use treaties to solve international collective action problems.26
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also John C. Calhoun, Speech in the Commercial Convention
with Great Britain (Jan. 9, 1816), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 132 (Richard K. Cralle
ed., 1864) (discussing the treaty power and remarking that in relation to the rest of the world, “the
states disappear” so that the country can present “the exterior of undivided sovereignty”).
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
23. Id.
24. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1089–90 (2000) (noting that
the Framers could have easily limited the substantive reach of the treaty power but chose not to,
producing the clear implication that “the President and Senate can make treaties on any subject
appropriate for negotiation and agreement among the states”).
25. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES
(1787), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND
HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING HIS NUMEROUS LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS
NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED 362 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901) (“[N]ot a year has passed
without instances of [treaty violations] in some one or other of the States. The Treaty of peace—
the treaty with France—the treaty with Holland have each been violated.”).
26. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (U.S. 1920) (upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act of 1918 as a constitutional implementation of a treaty between the United States and Great
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Further, allowing the President, a unitary actor, to control treaty
negotiations mitigates collective action problems that would result if a
more numerous body, like the Senate or full Congress, had the power
to negotiate directly with foreign countries.27 While these and other
suggestions are worthy areas for study, this Note will focus on the
history of the Treaty Clause itself and the extent to which that history
reflects collective action reasoning.
II. TREATIES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION BEFORE THE
CONSTITUTION
The Articles of Confederation imposed a high procedural bar that
made it difficult for the states to collectively form treaties with foreign
powers. That restraint played out in the Jay-Gardoqui treaty
negotiations between the Confederation and Spain, which can be
understood as an example of restrained collective action among the
states. This Part will first discuss the treaty power under the Articles of
Confederation and how it influenced the controversy surrounding the
Jay-Gardoqui treaty. Next, it will consider how the Jay-Gardoqui
controversy may have affected delegates’ attitudes heading into the
Constitutional Convention.
A. The Articles of Confederation and the Jay-Gardoqui Controversy
The Articles of Confederation centralized the treatymaking power
in the Confederation Congress.28 Each state could send up to seven
delegates to the Congress, but delegates voted together such that each
state had one vote.29 Article IX imposed a supermajority threshold,
requiring agreement from nine of the thirteen states to conclude a
treaty.30 Under Article VI, individual states could not circumvent this
process—any state seeking to make its own “conference, agreement,

Britain and noting that the national interest at issue “can be protected only by national action in
concert with that of another power”).
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 389 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001) (explaining that the “variable and . . . numerous” nature of the House of
Representatives was incompatible with the qualities needed to properly execute the treatymaking
power).
28. Golove, supra note 24, at 1103.
29. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMER’S COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 725 n.182 (2016) (“All states were entitled to send seven delegates to the
Confederation Congress—who would collectively cast their state’s one vote—but none of them
in fact sent that many, and many states regularly failed to send even the two delegates that were
required for a state’s vote to count.”).
30. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
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alliance or treaty” with a foreign power would need the consent of
Congress.31
This construction of the treaty power was highly flawed in light of
Congress’s limited powers to legislate. Congress could make treaties
but often could not pass laws to ensure that states would abide by
them.32 As a result, states could—and often did—violate the nation’s
treaties.33 The gulf between Congressional treaty power and legislative
power thus enabled states to flout treaty obligations in their own selfinterest and imperil the nation as a whole.34
But setting aside the question of Congress’s legislative power, the
treaty power under the Articles was beneficial in a narrower sense. At
a time when state identity likely superseded national identity,35 the
treaty power prevented one group of states—even a majority of
states—from concluding a treaty at the expense of another group. The
supermajority requirement gave a small number of states effective veto
power over any proposed treaty, preventing a majority of states from
using the power of Congress to advance an interest that was sectional
rather than truly national.36
The minority veto power served that exact function in the JayGardoqui treaty controversy. During that controversy, northern and
southern states split on the question of whether the states’ navigation
rights to the Mississippi River should be exchanged in a treaty with
31. Id. art. VI, para. 2.
32. See Golove, supra note 24, at 1103 (“Charged with the conduct of American foreign
affairs, Congress would inevitably seek to make treaties on subjects falling outside the scope of
its limited legislative authority.”).
33. See MADISON, supra note 25, at 362 (noting that states had imperiled the whole country
by violating treaties with foreign powers and asserting that “it ought to be least in the power of
any part of the Community to bring [foreign aggression] on the whole”).
34. See Golove, supra note 24, at 1103 (“[C]onflicts over the treaty power and states’ rights
were recurrent under the Confederation . . . states’ rights proponents did succeed in creating
controversy and uncertainty and sometimes even in seriously subverting Congress’s foreign policy
initiatives—indeed, so severely as to place the peace of the nation in jeopardy.”).
35. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II (asserting that under the Articles of
Confederation, each state retained its “sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right” not expressly delegated to the Confederation Congress).
36. See Golove, supra note 24, at 1099. In describing the supermajority requirement that the
Constitution would contain, which was effectively equal to the supermajority requirement under
the Articles, Golove explains that it enabled the “special political task of refusing . . . any treaty
that trenched too far on the interests of states without serving a sufficiently powerful
countervailing national interest.” Id. Golove thus casts the minority veto as a tool for states to
guard against the tensions of state versus national interests. But for some conflicts, the tension
can be restated as between the interests of a minority of states and the incompatible interests of
a majority states who—without a supermajority requirement—could assert their interests as
emblematic of the national interest.
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Spain. Were it not for the Articles’ supermajority requirement for
treaties, the treaty may have been ratified.
The southern states valued their access to the Mississippi River
because it had preserved their connection with the many southerners
who had already settled in the west and represented their prospects for
further expansion that could increase the south’s power in the union.37
The river had long been of strategic importance. Spain controlled the
river’s mouth before and during the American Revolution; it had
granted Great Britain free navigation of the river, but the rebelling
colonies could no longer claim that right.38 By 1778, a handful of
southern states claimed territory between the Ohio and Mississippi
rivers, but they all recognized that access to the west would have little
use if the Mississippi were unavailable to move products to the sea.39
At the end of the American Revolution, the Treaty of Paris
purported to promise the states free navigation of the Mississippi, but
Spain failed to mention navigation of the Mississippi in its own peace
treaty with Great Britain.40 When Americans poured west after the
Revolution, Spain reasserted its right to control navigation of the river,
and by 1785, it regularly seized American vessels using the river for
what it deemed to be illegal trade.41
With the threat of war looming, Spain sent a minister, Don Diego
de Gardoqui, to the United States with authority to offer a commercial
treaty in exchange for Congress’s recognition that Spain controlled the
Mississippi.42 Congress initially instructed Jay to hold firm on
America’s claims to the Mississippi.43 But commercial conditions in the
north worsened as Jay and Gardoqui negotiated—British interference
with northern states’ fishery rights spelled “practical ruin to the
shipping interest of New York and New England.”44 With the promise
37. See KLARMAN, supra note 29, at 54 (noting that most western settlers came from the
south and that “many southerners hoped that westward expansion ultimately would lead to the
creation of several western states”).
38. Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, 2 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 271, 277 (1934).
39. Id. at 276.
40. KLARMAN, supra note 29, at 49.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 49–50.
43. Report of the Committee, Aug. 25, 1785, in 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 658 (Library of Congress ed., 1904) [hereinafter CONT. CONG.
JOURNALS] (“That the Secretary to the United States for the Department of [F]oreign Affairs be
and he is hereby instructed . . . particularly to stipulate the right of the United States to their
territorial bounds, and the free Navigation of the Mississippi, from the source to the Ocean.”).
44. Warren, supra note 38, at 282.

BEACH_03_16_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

288

3/17/2021 7:20 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

that intercourse with Spain would secure northern industry, northern
states became willing to concede American rights to the west.45 Finally,
Jay himself became convinced that some concession of western
interests was necessary if a treaty with Spain were to take form.46 He
thus proposed that Congress give him new instructions that would let
him sacrifice the American claim to the Mississippi for twenty-five
years.47
Jay’s request for reinstruction stirred great controversy.
Southerners who saw their future in the west perceived Jay’s proposal
as an unjust abuse of Congress’s power.48 Meanwhile, northern states
“felt strongly on the subject of their devastated commerce and were
little inclined to allow theoretical Western rights to stand in the way of
the chances for their own increased prosperity.”49 The regional division
crystallized when Congress finally voted on the question of whether to
reinstruct Jay—Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey voted for the
measure, while Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia voted against it.50 Although a majority of states had voted
for reinstruction, the opposing minority would be able to block any
subsequent treaty.51
B. Regional Tension Heading into the Constitutional Convention
The Jay-Gardoqui controversy can be understood as an instance of
restraining collective action to prevent minority exploitation, and it
created significant regional tension in the years preceding the
Constitutional Convention. Framed in collective action terms, northern
states wanted to secure a treaty with Spain that allocated benefits to
the northern majority—in the form of a commercial boon for northern
fisheries—while imposing costs on the southern minority by limiting
access to the Mississippi River and hindering western expansion. As
South Carolina’s Charles Pinckney perceived the attempted treaty, it
represented a policy that was “calculated to acquire benefits for one

45. See id. at 283 (“[S]elf interest led these [northern states] to join with the opponents of
the West and to contend that Congress should allow Jay to obtain favorable terms of commercial
intercourse from Spain, by a concession as to the Western rights.”).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 284–85.
50. Id. at 285. Delaware was absent from the vote. Id.
51. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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part of the confederacy at the expence [sic] of the other.”52 If the
Articles had required a simple majority of states to make a treaty, the
northern states likely would have succeeded.53 A majority of states
would have acted collectively, but it would have come at the expense of
the minority.
Even though the Jay-Gardoqui treaty did not come into force, the
controversy surrounding it aggravated regional tensions and sowed
regional distrust in the years leading up to the Constitutional
Convention. Some believed that the northern states were willing to
sacrifice the Mississippi in order to “keep[] the weight of [government]
and population” in the north and east, and they would have rather seen
the Union destroyed than fail in their effort.54 Looking ahead to the
potential for a new government, James Madison predicted that “unless
the project to yield . . . the Mississippi for twenty-five years be
abandoned by Congress, the hopes of carrying [Virginia] into a proper
federal system will be demolished.”55 Madison thus echoed a sentiment
similar to Pinckney’s: Navigation of the Mississippi was an interest
itself, but it also had serious implications for southern states’ place in
the national order.
Some northern delegates reciprocated the southern delegates’
mistrust and held similarly strong views about their southern
counterparts after the Jay-Gardoqui controversy. Rufus King of
Massachusetts doubted whether it was really in the northern states’
interest to preserve the south’s ability for westward expansion.
Doubting that the nation would ever raise “a penny of revenue” from
western settlers, he wrote, “I should consider every emigrant to that
country from the Atlantic states as forever lost to the Confederacy.”56
Theodore Sedgwick—also of Massachusetts—similarly doubted if
cooperation was in the northern states’ interests and encouraged the

52. Charles Pinckney, Speech, In Answer to Mr. Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on the
Question of a treaty with Spain (Aug. 16, 1786), in 31 CONT. CONG. JOURNALS, supra note 43, at
945. For Pinckney, the controversy extended beyond the particular treaty at issue and cast doubt
on the Confederation Congress’s viability as a government. He questioned whether states that
felt themselves injured by an imbalanced treaty would continue to trust Congress to wield its
power: “Will [the injured states] not urge . . . the impropriety of vesting that body with further
powers, which has so recently abused those they already possess?” Id.
53. See Warren, supra note 38, at 285.
54. Letter from James Monroe to Patrick Henry (Aug. 12, 1786) in 8 LETTERS OF MEMBERS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1785-1789, at 424–25 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 1936)
[hereinafter CONT. CONG. LETTERS].
55. Warren, supra note 38, at 287.
56. Id. at 286.

BEACH_03_16_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

290

3/17/2021 7:20 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

northern states to seriously “consider what advantages result to them
from their connection with the southern states.”57
These statements, although merely samples of the sentiment
leading up to the Constitutional Convention, reflect strong distrust
between groups of states who needed to cooperate to secure a peaceful
and prosperous future through international agreements. The Articles’
supermajority requirement for treaties kept the Confederation from
concluding the controversial treaty with Spain. But for many
southerners, the treaty came uncomfortably close to fruition. For
Monroe and many of his fellow Virginians, the Jay-Gardoqui affair and
the division it fomented became a substantial driving force behind the
Constitutional Convention.58 But whatever changes southern delegates
to the Constitutional Convention had envisioned for a new system of
government, they “embarked on constitutional reform with vivid
memories” of the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations.59
III. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND TREATIES DURING DRAFTING AND
RATIFICATION
The Framers and Ratifiers were acutely aware that an
insufficiently-restrained treaty power could empower the tyranny of
the majority. At times, the delegates stated explicitly that restraining
the treaty power was one of their goals.60 Further, a clear pattern
emerged among their proposals: Many offered ways to limit the treaty
power by procedural means.61 This part will first show that fear of
minority state exploitation motivated debates over the Treaty Clause
at the Constitutional Convention. Next, it will demonstrate that the
same concern resurfaced during the ratification debates in Virginia and
North Carolina. Lastly, it will briefly describe the diversity of
viewpoints in the broader ratification discussions.

57. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Caleb Strong (Aug. 6, 1787), in 8 CONT. CONG.
LETTERS, supra note 54, at 415.
58. See Lance Banning, Virginia: Sectionalism and the Common Good, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION 261, 267 (discussing some Virginians’ reactions to the Jay-Gardoqui controversy
and noting that “no other episode . . . engendered such intense and uniform emotional revulsion”
or “suggested so convincingly how chronic differences between New England and Virginia could
suddenly erupt in pressing dangers”).
59. Id.
60. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 393 (Max Farrand. ed.,
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS].
61. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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A. The Constitutional Convention
Statements at the Constitutional Convention speak directly to the
Framers’ goal of limiting the new government’s treatymaking power.
When an early version of the treaty power gave the responsibility to
the Senate alone, Madison—likely recalling the Jay-Gardoqui affair—
advocated for including another procedural hurdle. He observed “that
the Senate represented the States alone, and that . . . it was proper that
the President should be an agent in Treaties.”62 Requiring approval
from the President would add another procedural check on the
treatymaking process, and one from an official who would be
accountable to all voters by virtue of a national electorate. Gouverneur
Morris of Pennsylvania was unsure that the treaty power should rest
with the Senate, and he moved to amend the power to clarify that no
treaty would be binding on the country unless implemented by a
corresponding act of Congress.63 He argued that the Framers should
craft a deliberately onerous treatymaking process because it would be
disadvantageous to multiply the country’s treaty obligations.64 “The
more difficulty in making treaties,” he explained, “the more value will
be set on them.”65
Other proposed modifications, some adopted and many unadopted,
show that the Framers looked to procedural mechanisms to restrain
treatymaking and to ensure that ratified treaties had broad, crossregional support. Like Morris’s proposal to require implementing
legislation for all treaties, the proposal to give the House of
Representatives a treatymaking role would have diffused regional
tensions by requiring approval from a national, directly-apportioned
body.66 Requiring approval from a supermajority of the Senate—either
the full body or just present members—would preserve the system of
the Articles of Confederation, under which a minority of states could
block any treaty.67

62. 2 RECORDS, supra note 60, at 392.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 393.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 538.
67. Id. at 540. Numerous other proposals would have treated different types of treaties as
more or less deserving of restraint. Id. For example, to facilitate the end of war when it was quickly
needed, Madison suggested that peace treaties should be exempt from the supermajority
requirement, and that the Senate should be able to conclude them without the president. Id.
Delegates also suggested that the treaty power should subcategorize even further and still subject
peace treaties to the supermajority requirement if they affected territorial rights. Id. at 540–41.
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Given the importance of properly allocating treatymaking power
within the new government and the many choices for how that power
could be structured, the delegates ended their first major discussion of
the treaty power by noting that “almost every Speaker had made
objections to the clause as it stood.”68 When the Framers eventually
settled on the final version, it was undoubtedly a political concession.69
At the time the Constitution was written, states representing around 14
percent of the population had enough votes in the Senate to block a
treaty if their priorities aligned.70 In a new system generally predicated
on majority rule, the Treaty Clause was an unusual departure.
B. The Ratification Debates
The ratification debates in Virginia and North Carolina show that
the treaty power was an important factor for southern states in
evaluating the new Constitution. Delegates who attacked the treaty
power argued that Article II might fail to prevent treaties that
exploited a minority of states.
The treaty power was a significant sticking point for many critics of
the Constitution in Virginia. Nearly 10 percent of pages in the printed
debates from the Virginia convention are focused on the treaty power
alone.71 The discussions reflected delegates’ serious skepticism that the
treaty clause would sufficiently restrain northern states from
disadvantaging the south.72 According to James Monroe, the proposed
Constitution made treatymaking too easy because it required only the
President and “[t]wo thirds of those [senators] who may happen to be
present.”73 Implied in Monroe’s emphasis is the fear that senators from
the north could conclude a treaty in a session with a sufficient quorum
to conduct business, but without full representation from the south.
Alluding to the south’s fear from the Jay-Gardoqui controversy,

68. Id. at 393.
69. See VAN CLEVE, supra note 7, at 289 (noting that to ensure ratification, “the convention
had no political alternative but to make concessions to persistent sectional jealousies and states’
sovereignty claims,” including over the supermajority requirements for treaties and constitutional
amendments).
70. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 48 (1944).
71. Warren, supra note 38, at 297.
72. See Banning, supra note 58, at 279–80 (noting that fear of northern domination
characterized discussions at the Virginia ratification convention, and that it was the Mississippi
controversy that best demonstrated the potential for sectional aggression to arise).
73. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 221 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2nd ed. 1891) [hereinafter DEBATES].
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Monroe explained that “a very small number” of senators could
“sacrifice the dearest interests of the Southern States” by ceding their
territory.74 Patrick Henry argued similar points and expressly
referenced the dispute over the Mississippi.75 Arguing that the Articles’
treaty power was diluted in the proposed Constitution, Henry
explained, “While the consent of nine states is necessary to the cession
of territory, you are safe. If it be put in the power of a less number, you
will most infallibly lose the Mississippi.”76
John Dawson, another delegate, framed the issue in even more
striking collective action terms. For Dawson, concern over the
Mississippi in particular was justified, but the Jay-Gardoqui
controversy broadly illustrated that the treaty clause could enable a
small group of states to pursue their own self-interest at the expense of
other states and the union as a whole.77 For Dawson, the treaty power
in the Articles had nearly ceded the Union’s hopes for western
expansion.78 So even if the proposed treaty power in the new
Constitution were equally as restraining, it would still fail to “guard
against . . . a scheme, to which nothing but an inattention to the general
interest of America, and a selfish regard to the interest of particular
states, could have given rise.”79 The proposed Constitution’s treaty
power thus appeared insufficient to stop the minority exploitation that
the Articles of Confederation narrowly prevented.
Delegates to the first North Carolina ratification convention also
expressly referenced the Jay-Gardoqui controversy as they debated the
proposed Constitution’s merits. Like Monroe, William Porter of North
Carolina feared that the treaty power would enable minority state
exploitation.80 The President and a small number of senators, he
explained, “might give up the rivers and territory” of the southern
states to make a treaty that advantaged the northern states but equally
injured the south.81 In doing so, the northern states would pass off their

74. Id.
75. Id. at 141.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 609 (“My objections to it do not arise from a view of the particular situation of
the western part of this state . . . but from an apprehension that the principle pervades all
America, and that in its operation, it will be found highly injurious to the southern states.”).
78. See id. at 610 (stating that the treaty power under the Articles had already given southern
states “cause to tremble”).
79. Id.
80. 4 DEBATES, supra note 73, at 115.
81. Id.
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regional interest as the national interest.82 If the President and twothirds of present senators were to have such power, Porter feared
nothing would counsel them against abusing it.83
Porter was not alone in his sentiment that the Treaty Clause created
the potential for significant abuse of majority power. Timothy
Bloodworth, another delegate to the North Carolina convention,
indirectly commented on the treaty power as he emphasized what he
perceived as government’s inherent tendency to expand its own
authority.84 Bloodworth reminded his audience of the Jay-Gardoqui
controversy to illustrate his point that “[e]very possible precaution
should be taken” when granting powers.85 Although the Jay-Gardoqui
treaty never became operative, it was enough for Bloodworth that a
majority of states voted to sacrifice the Mississippi.86 That Congress
reinstructed Jay despite lacking supermajority support vindicated
Bloodworth’s fear of misplacing power and underscored that the
Articles’ treaty power was all that stopped a northern majority from
sacrificing the interests of a southern minority.87
These examples from Virginia and North Carolina do not fully
capture the diversity of southern delegates’ views on the treaty power.
Some delegates to those conventions supported the Treaty Clause.88
The Treaty Clause also had plenty of support elsewhere—Alexander
Hamilton, for example, wrote that it was “one of the best digested and
most unexceptionable parts” of the constitutional plan.89 For some
federalists, defense of the treaty power reflected aspirations for a future
of national unity. In this hopeful vision, the equally-represented states
82. See id. (suggesting that northern states would ratify an exploitive treaty but that “in the
preamble of the Constitution, they say all the people have done it”).
83. See id. (“I should be glad to know what power there is of calling the President and Senate
to account.”).
84. Id. at 167.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 167–68 (“By [the Articles of Confederation], nine states are required to make
a treaty; yet seven states said that they could . . . repeal part of the instructions given our secretary
for foreign affairs, which prohibited him from making a treaty to give up the Mississippi to
Spain . . . .”).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 73, at 500. James Madison argued at the Virginia
Convention that the threat of impeachment would prevent the President from concluding unfair
treaties. Id. Governor Samuel Johnson argued the same at the first North Carolina Convention
and dismissed the concern that the Treaty Clause only required a supermajority of present
senators because senators would not be absent if their states’ interests were at risk. 4 DEBATES,
supra note 73, at 115.
89. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 387 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
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would assume in the Senate “a national form, and a national character”
that would remember “that the good of the whole can only be
promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts” that comprise
it.90 But whatever hopes some had for the future of the treaty power,
the version enshrined in the Constitution arose not from unity, but from
interstate distrust and fear of the tyrannical majority.
IV. COLLECTIVE ACTION IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY POWER
TODAY
The historical conditions animating the treaty power carry much
less weight today. The supermajority requirement no longer has to
guard against the pronounced regional rivalries of 1787, and it likely
precludes treatymaking where states would benefit from it. The modern
preference for alternative forms of international agreements supports
this assertion, as the federal government has found a work-around to
treatymaking by using executive agreements instead.
A. Challenging the Treaty Power’s Assumptions
As Part III illustrates, the Treaty Clause developed from two
assumptions that arose during the Jay-Gardoqui controversy. The
framers assumed that (1) some treaties would benefit a majority of
states by threatening to exploit the opposing minority, and (2) senators
would be sufficient bulwarks to prevent that exploitation from
happening. But historical and political developments since the
founding reduce the weight of these animating assumptions.
First, southern concern over the Mississippi River became moot
long ago—that debate ended in 1803 when the Louisiana Purchase
secured permanent control of the Mississippi for the United States.91
That control neutralizes what made the Jay-Gardoqui treaty such a
salient example of minority exploitation: the clean split of its costs and
benefits among the states based on the states’ narrow self-interests. The
west was considered uniquely vital to the south’s future.92 Access to the
90. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 336 (John Jay) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
2001).
91. Some scholars argue that the Louisiana Purchase was itself an unconstitutional exercise
of the treaty power. See, e.g., Robert Knowles, The Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty:
States’ Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV. 343, 345 (2002). President Jefferson
himself worried that it was unconstitutional—in rejecting the argument that purchasing the
territory would be permissible because the treaty power was boundless, Jefferson wrote, “If it is,
then we have no Constitution.” Id. at 346.
92. See Banning, supra note 58, at 265 (“[A]s of 1786, the West was everywhere perceived

BEACH_03_16_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

296

3/17/2021 7:20 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

west was central to southern states’ understanding of their power in the
union and to the future of slavery.93 Moreover, southerners—unlike
most northerners—had familial connections and kinship with the
newly settled westerners.94 A state’s position on the Jay-Gardoqui
treaty could be predicted by its position on a map, because depending
on where each state sat, it either received all of the benefits of the
exchange or bore all of its costs.95 When ceding territory through a
treaty was a real possibility, it made sense that a minority of states—
those most affected by the cession—should have had the power to
defeat the treaty.
However, modern analogs are unlikely to threaten minority state
exploitation as plainly as the Jay-Gardoqui treaty did because
America’s borders are settled, and treaties are unlikely to alter them in
a significant way. A treaty today could still evoke a clear split between
regions of the country. But that would likely result from ideological or
partisan differences that tend to track the geography of states and not
any factor that can itself determine which states enjoy the treaty’s
benefits and which states internalize its costs.96
For example, several treaties obligate signatories to abolish the
death penalty in all or virtually all cases.97 If one such treaty came
before the Senate, and if each senator voted consistent with her home
state’s rule on the death penalty, the vote would split evenly along

as an extension of the South.”).
93. See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L. J. 1236, 1283 (2008) (“Free trade and emigration
were, in turn, viewed by many as essential to maintaining the South’s political clout in the new
union, presumably thereby protecting the tenuous compromise over slavery by making it possible
for new slave states to form in the south.”).
94. See Banning, supra note 58, at 265 (“Settlers in Kentucky or in Tennessee were often
literally the kin or former neighbors of important southern families, and a great deal more than
family fortunes seemed at stake in their continued membership in the American union.”).
95. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
96. A geography-based treaty split among the states would not be impossible today. For
example, a treaty that sacrifices America’s control over Guam, might evoke strong objections
from states in the western U.S. that would feel vulnerable without the geostrategic protection that
Guam and other Pacific U.S. territories provide. But it is unlikely that eastern states today would
be as willing to concede territory as the northern states were in the 1785 because, as Jay hoped in
THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, the determination would take on a more national character. See supra
note 90 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, aiming at abolition of the death penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, 29 I.L.M. 1464 (1990); Protocol
No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty, Europ. T.S. No. 114 (entered into force
Mar. 1, 1985).
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roughly regional lines.98 States on the west coast and in the northeast
and upper midwest have already abolished or restricted the death
penalty, and states in the southeast and western heartland retain it for
the most part.99 Because the vote would split with twenty-five states on
either side, the treaty would fall far short of Article II’s supermajority
requirement.100 This regional split is not unique to the death penalty—
for example, a treaty addressing climate change by setting greenhouse
gas emission targets would likely track along those same geographical
lines.101
Because most modern treaties are unlikely to implicate the
minority state exploitation that animated the Treaty Clause, it is
difficult to see why the supermajority requirement should continue to
restrain agreements for national issues like capital punishment or
greenhouse gas emissions. To be sure, a self-executing treaty on one of
those subjects would surely implicate federalism concerns just like
analogous domestic lawmaking. But if the supermajority requirement
for treaties were bypassed, each state would still have a voice under a
majority threshold in the Senate—or a sixty-vote threshold to invoke
cloture—just like they do for domestic legislation.
One could still argue that each state needs more of a voice when
the federal government is considering action that will bind states
collectively on the international stage.102 Under that reasoning, fidelity
to Article II is what gives treaties their status as binding law.103 Thus,

98. State by State, THE DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stateand-federal-info/state-by-state (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
99. Id.
100. Id. This split does not reflect the efforts to end capital punishment in Virginia that are
in-progress as of the time of writing on March 3, 2021. See Laura Vozzella & Gregory S. Schneider,
Lawmakers Vote to Make Virginia First Southern State to Abolish Death Penalty, WASH. POST
(Feb. 22, 2021, 2:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-deathpenalty-ban/2021/02/22/742eed3e-7146-11eb-93be-c10813e358a2_story.html (“Two bills to
abolish the death penalty in Virginia won final approval in the state General Assembly on
Monday and were headed to Gov. Ralph Northam (D), who is expected to sign them.”).
101. State Climate Policy Maps; Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets, THE CTR. FOR CLIMATE
& ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/state-climate-policy/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2021).
102. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1246–47 (1995) (“The United
States Constitution tries to define with some precision the processes that determine which laws,
treaties, or agreements will in fact be binding upon us. We must look to the procedural
requirements of these enabling provisions to evaluate the validity of something purporting to be
law.”).
103. See id. at 1247 (“We can know that something has the binding force of law only if it
complies with the requirements that, as a matter of social fact, we have agreed must be met when
law is to be made.”).
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“architectural provisions [of the Constitution] that specify the
processes by which government is to effect legal change, such as . . . the
Treaty Clause of Article II, clearly demand a fairly rigid definition.”104
But internationally-binding non-Article II agreements have their own
basis in the Constitution, and historical practice has long-since rejected
formal adherence to the Article II treaty process.105
Second, political changes to the Senate challenge the Treaty
Clause’s assumption that senators will primarily protect their states in
the treatymaking process. The Seventeenth Amendment likely changed
the extent to which senators represent their particular states’ interests
by providing that senators would take office through direct popular
election instead of appointment by state legislatures.106 Senate
candidates instead must appeal to voters, not state legislators. If voters
are less adept at recognizing—or less persuaded by—Senate
candidates’ positions on treaties as compared to other issues, this
change likely reduces the extent to which each senator represents her
state as a player in the treatymaking process.107 One can argue that the
states’ interests should be better represented in the treaty process than
they currently are. But that is a separate, normative claim, which admits
that if the Article II supermajority requirement looks to senators to
protect state interests, it may do so in vain.
B. The Modern Use of Non-Article II Treaties
The collective action understanding of the Treaty Clause becomes
more persuasive in light of the modern U.S. practice for international
agreements. The vast majority of international agreements that the U.S.
joins today are not completed through the Article II treaty process.108

104. Id. at 1248.
105. See Part IV.B, infra.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see Sean Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, Agency Problems,
the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 324, 332 (2009)
(analyzing Senate voting records before and after the Seventeenth Amendment and concluding
that after its passage, “senators became substantially less responsive to the policy interests of the
state legislature”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 412
(2005) (discussing the effects of the Seventeenth Amendment and noting that after it, senators
were “[l]iberated from all dependence on state governments” and “freer to pursue policies that
state officials might not like”).
107. See Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847, 863 (1979) (“As Senators and Members of the House develop independent
constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the
poor, each of which generally supports certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with
state interests and the positions of state officials is reduced.”).
108. See Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1287 (“Congressional-executive agreements have thus
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Instead, most agreements proceed as either congressional-executive
agreements or sole executive agreements.109 The prevalence of
executive agreements over treaties and the debate over the
interchangeability of the two agreement forms likely suggest—
consistent with collective action reasoning—that the Article II treaty
process indeed over-restrains treatymaking.110
Executive agreements are international agreements that the U.S.
joins outside the Article II treaty process. Executive agreements are
either concluded by the President alone (sole executive agreements) or
with Congress’s authorization (congressional-executive agreements).111
Congressional-executive agreements can have either ex ante or ex post
authorization from Congress.112 Ex post approvals are negotiated by the
executive branch before going to Congress for an up or down vote.113
Ex ante congressional-executive agreements do not go to Congress for
a final vote—the executive branch forms them alone based on earlier
statutory authorization, and they come into force when their party
nations sign them.114
Executive agreements have existed since the time of America’s
founding.115 But most of America’s early international agreements
were formed as treaties—between 1789 and 1839, the United States

been present at nearly every period of American history, but they have rapidly grown more
numerous and important since the 1940s.”).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 1307–37 (arguing that in the vast majority of cases where treaties and executive
agreements are legally interchangeable, executive agreements should be preferred because they
have stronger democratic legitimacy, require a less cumbersome process, and lead to more
reliable international commitments).
111. Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1239. The President forms a sole executive agreement
without any formal action from Congress. Id. In that sense, sole executive agreements represent
the opposite extreme of treaties in America’s international lawmaking—whereas Article II
treaties have a high procedural bar that restrains collective action, sole executive agreements are
barred mostly by political checks. Id. But to note that difference is not to suggest easier
international lawmaking is always better. Id. Unilateral lawmaking presents its own challenges,
including restrained negotiating power and lessened democratic legitimacy. Id.; see also Oona A.
Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L. J. 140,
147 (2009) [hereinafter Presidential Power] (noting that Presidents may struggle to build political
support for agreements concluded without input from Congress, and that negotiating with
Congress’s input may enable a President to make concessions that would otherwise be
unavailable).
112. Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1259.
113. Presidential Power, supra note 111, at 149.
114. Id.
115. For example, a 1792 Act of Congress authorized the Postmaster General to “make
arrangements with the postmasters in any foreign country for the reciprocal receipt and delivery”
of mail. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239.
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made sixty treaties and twenty-seven executive agreements.116 In each
successive fifty-year period, the balance shifted away from the treaty
process and towards executive agreements.117 The trend is pronounced,
particularly in recent years: between 2001 and 2016, the United States
concluded 3,021 executive agreements and only 132 treaties.118 The
numerical shift alone suggests that the treaty power is not an effective
facilitator of the country’s high demand for international agreements.
Moreover, the lack of a meaningful distinction for when each type
of agreement is used supports the suggestion that the treaty power’s
reasons for restraining collective action are less persuasive today. There
is a limited connection between the substantive focus of an
international agreement and the particular form of agreement used.119
Discernible patterns for choosing one agreement form versus another
exist, but some scholars argue that those patterns are not based on any
rational principle.120
The current system took hold over the twentieth century and can
be explained by America’s growing appetite for international trade and
regional opposition to human rights treaties.121 As the country
benefitted from international agreements, the Treaty Clause’s
procedural protections became overly burdensome.122 But as the reach
of non-Article II agreements grew, certain categories of agreement still
evaded its grasp. When some senators perceived that human rights
treaties would threaten segregation and Jim Crow, they proposed
constitutional amendments to prevent the United States from entering
those agreements.123 After President Eisenhower campaigned against
the amendments, the conflict ended in a compromise: The amendments

116. CONG. RES. SERV., S. PRT. 106-71, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 39 (2001).
117. Id.
118. Jeffrey S. Peake, The Decline of Treaties? Obama, Trump, and the Politics of
International Agreements 40 (Apr. 6, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3153840.
119. Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1239.
120. See id. at 1239–40 (noting content-based patterns for Article II treaties versus executive
agreements and concluding that there is “no persuasive explanation . . . based on subject matter,
form, topic, or any other substantive basis”).
121. Id.
122. See id. (asserting that executive agreements first enabled the country’s abandonment of
trade protectionism in favor of reciprocal trade agreements and “subsequently expanded to
include almost every area of international law”).
123. See id. at 1303 (characterizing the amendments, referred to collectively as the Bricker
Amendment, as a “thinly veiled effort to prevent the use of international human rights
agreements to curtail racial segregation in the United States”).
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would fail, thus preserving executive power over foreign affairs, but the
United States would not join the growing collection of human rights
treaties.124 With this context, the line between Article II treaties and
other international agreements appears motivated by disagreement
over human rights obligations rather than a distinction between
procedural mechanisms for any particular agreement.
V. CRITICISMS AND LIMITS OF THE COLLECTIVE ACTION
FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATY POWER
Collective action reasoning can provide a useful framework for
understanding the treaty power. But that framework may be vulnerable
to criticism based on the Constitution’s text and a closer look at the
modern use of Article II treaties and executive agreements. Moreover,
even if, despite its faults, the collective action framework remains
useful, its utility is still limited by the antecedent question of whether a
proposed international agreement implicates minority state
exploitation at all.
First, the treaty is the only form of international agreement that the
Constitution expressly provides.125 Insofar as the collective action
understanding of the treaty power favors congressional-executive
agreements over the excessively restrained Article II process, it must
be reconciled with the textual absence of a Congressional-Executive
Agreement Clause. But non-Article II agreements have their own
bases in the text and historical practice. Article I clearly contemplates
that Congress will act on the international stage without going through
the treaty process,126 and early America made both Article II treaties
and congressional-executive agreements.127 In addition, the Supreme
Court has held that “all international compacts and agreements” are
entitled to federal supremacy, just as treaties are.128 More
124. Id. at 1303–04 (explaining that the Bricker Amendment had a lasting impact by delaying
U.S. entry into many international human rights agreements and by laying the groundwork to
render those that the U.S. has joined unenforceable through reservations, understandings, and
declarations).
125. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 174 (1972) (“The
Constitution expressly prescribes the treaty procedure, and nowhere suggests that another
method of making international agreements is available, and that it would do as well.”).
126. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress to, among other powers, regulate
commerce with foreign nations, define and punish violations of the law of nations, and declare
war).
127. See Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1287 (“In the first half century of its independence, the
United States ratified sixty treaties but joined only twenty-seven published executive
agreements.”).
128. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (explaining that all international
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fundamentally, to read the Treaty Clause as prohibiting other types of
agreements is itself an interpretation that requires justification. For
example, the Declare War Clause does not practically prevent the
President from using military force without authorization in what
common parlance would deem acts of war. 129 Similarly, the Treaty
Clause need not be read to restrain non-Article II agreements when
the collective action justifications for the Treaty Clause’s supermajority
requirement are not implicated.
Congressional-executive agreements may still provoke some
discomfort from a textual perspective. These agreements raise
questions that Article II treaties do not, such as whether a veto-proof
majority could pass an international agreement over the President’s
disapproval.130 But acknowledging that collective action reasoning
favors executive agreements over Article II treaties in some cases does
not require one to argue for full interchangeability between the two
agreement types.
Second, the collective action understanding does not fully explain
the current practice surrounding international agreements. Although it
helps illuminate why non-Article II agreements have come to
predominate over traditional treaties, it does not explain why certain
types of agreements are directed through one mechanism or the other.
If collective action explained this split, Article II treaties would be
those that raise a greater risk of exploiting a minority of states. In
theory, this sorting of agreements would occur through political checks.
If the President signaled plans for a new international agreement that
was potentially exploitive, senators could protect minority states by
conditioning their support on adherence to the Article II process. But
no such pattern presents itself, so collective action reasoning cannot
explain why some groups of agreements are seemingly administered
through Article II while others are not.131
Moreover, collective action reasoning may only justify or explain
the use of some non-Article II agreements. To use collective action
agreements are free from the states’ interference because “complete power over international
affairs is in the national government”).
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see, e.g., Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 14–16 (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal
Adviser, Dep’t of State) (arguing that President Obama did not need Congress’s approval to
continue air strikes in Libya).
130. See generally Tribe, supra note 102 (rejecting a flexible interpretation of the Treaty
Clause).
131. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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reasoning to support congressional-executive agreements as sensible
workarounds to the Article II treaty process assumes that the
agreements enable more collective action than treaties while still giving
a say to the states acting through Congress. But that assumption is
wholly untrue for sole executive agreements, and it is substantially
weakened even for ex ante congressional-executive agreements. The
executive branch makes sole executive agreements without any formal
input from Congress, and although ex ante congressional-executive
agreements hook onto authorizing statutes, they do not go back to
Congress before they become operative.132 Thus, legislators do not cast
final up or down votes on sole executive agreements or on ex ante
congressional executive agreements, even though the agreements bind
the U.S. on the international stage just as Article II treaties do.133 So
even if collective action reasoning explains why relatively few of the
country’s international agreements are concluded through Article II, it
does not fully justify the large portion of non-Article II agreements that
are formed without up or down votes from Congress.134
Finally, even if one accepts the collective action understanding of
the treaty power as a useful framework, it cannot fully answer which
proposed agreements distribute costs and benefits among the states so
unevenly that they should go through the Article II process. Identifying
which agreements pose the greatest risk of minority state exploitation
is likely a value-driven question on which objective agreement would
be difficult. Moreover, the Senate itself would likely be the body that
signals that the President must push an agreement through one
mechanism or the other. But if an agreement had enough support to
pass the Senate as a congressional-executive agreement, it is unlikely
that a minority of senators would be able to force it through the Article
II process.

132. Hathaway, supra note 93, at 1255–56.
133. See Presidential Power, supra note 111, at 150 (noting the lack of formal Congressional
involvement in concluding sole executive agreements and ex ante congressional-executive
agreements and claiming that “few outside the executive branch even know of their existence
until after they have become binding on the United States”).
134. See id. at 155 (“Between 1990 and 2000, for example, approximately twenty percent of
all executive agreements were sole executive agreements. The remaining eighty percent were
congressional-executive agreements.”).
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CONCLUSION
Collective action problems arise when actors need to work together
to achieve a shared outcome but are either unable to do so or incentives
discourage cooperation. Collective action is unlikely when it requires
unanimous approval from the group. When groups work on majority
rule, they can act more easily. But changing the threshold for action
from unanimity to something less raises the risk that majority power
will become majority tyranny.
The states struggled to solve collective action problems under the
Articles of Confederation. Some provisions of the Constitution can be
understood as facilitating collective action by creating a federal
government that could act on majority rule. The Treaty Clause is
another instance of withholding a power from the states and giving it
to the federal government, but its supermajority requirement restrains
collective action by setting a threshold for action between unanimity
and mere majority rule.
Responding largely to the acute historical controversy over the JayGardoqui treaty negotiations, the Framers gave a minority of states the
power to limit collective action when they perceived that a treaty would
unfairly burden them to other states’ benefit. This collective action
understanding of the treaty power suggests that its supermajority
requirement is most important for agreements that would enable a
majority of states to exploit a minority of states.
Today, the factors that animated the treaty power’s supermajority
requirement are no longer as relevant as they once were. Political and
historical changes challenge the assumptions behind the treaty power.
Because modern treaties are unlikely to exploit minority states in the
way the Framers had feared, agreements that bypass Article II are
reasonable workarounds to an overly-restraining supermajority
requirement. The collective action framework cannot be applied as a
formula to identify when a proposed agreement will distribute costs
and benefits so poorly that it portends exploitation of a minority of
states. But understanding the Treaty Clause’s relationship to collective
action can highlight that in most modern cases, the Clause’s restraint
on international agreements is unwarranted.

